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Abstract 
In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion 
credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under 
pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at 
risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early 
November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a 
warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a portion of AIG’s debt 
to the FRBNY, restructured the terms of the credit line, and deleveraged AIG’s balance sheet. 
With similar concerns arising at the end of the first quarter of 2009, Treasury made a second 
TARP investment of $30 billion in exchange for 300,000 shares of Series F preferred stock 
and another common stock warrant. Treasury converted all the preferred stock from its 
TARP investments into AIG common stock in January 2011 and sold it over the following two 
years. 
Keywords: AIG, Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act (EESA), preferred stock, warrant, capital injections 
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At a Glance  
Congress passed the 
Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 on 
October 3, 2008, authorizing 
the creation of the $700 billion 
Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP), which the US 
Treasury used to provide 
financial assistance to bank, 
non-bank, and non-financial 
institutions and markets 
(EESA 2008). Under TARP, the 
Systemically Significant 
Failing Institutions (SSFI) 
program aimed to “to provide 
capital on a case-by-case basis 
to systemically significant 
institutions that are at 
substantial risk of failure 
(Treasury 2008e, 3).”  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) had extended to AIG, the nation’s largest 
insurance company, an $85 billion loan in September, but the company’s financial woes 
continued. In November, Treasury invested $40 billion in AIG under the SSFI program 
(Webel 2017, 14). AIG used the funds to partially repay some of its debt to the FRBNY under 
the credit facility  (AIG 2010). In exchange, Treasury received 4 million shares of Series D 
preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 53 million shares of common stock (AIG 2009, 
193; Treasury 2008b, pdf 228). 
As AIG’s financial condition continued to worsen, the Fed and Treasury announced a 
restructuring plan in March 2009 in which it modified some of the terms of the November 
2008 investment (FRB 2008b). Treasury exchanged the Series D preferred stock it had 
received for 400,000 shares of Series E preferred stock that better resembled AIG common 
equity and would thus improve AIG’s financial leverage (FRB 2008b). Further, Treasury 
committed an additional $30 billion of TARP funds to AIG under an equity capital facility, 
with $165 million set aside to pay retention bonuses for employees of AIG’s Financial 
Products unit (GAO 2009, 35). In exchange, Treasury received 300,000 shares of Series F 
preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 3,000 shares of AIG common stock (GAO 2009, 
35). Treasury later retitled the two SSFI investments in AIG the “AIG Investment Program.” 
In January 2011, Treasury executed a recapitalization plan for AIG, converting the preferred 
stock accumulated through the two TARP investments into more than 1 million shares of AIG 
common stock.   By December 2012, Treasury had sold off all its AIG common stock to recoup 
its investment (Treasury 2012a). In March 2013, Treasury sold its warrants back to AIG, 
officially ending all government interest and assistance in AIG (Webel 2017, 4).  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To assist AIG in managing its leverage by paying down a 
portion of the loan provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and providing cash reserves 
 November 2008 
Investment 
March 2009  
Investment 
Announcement Date  November 10, 2008 March 2, 2009 
Operational Date November 25, 2008 April 17, 2009 
Termination Date  January 14, 2011 January 14, 2011 
Investment Amount $40.0 billion Up to $30.0 billion 
Max. Amount Utilized $40.0 billion $27.8 billion 
Type of Preferred 
Stock Included 
4 million shares of 
Series D cumulative 
preferred stock, 








Warrant 2% common stock 1% common stock 
American International Group, Inc.:  
AIG Investment Program 
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Financial analysts and regulators believe that the TARP investments in AIG did improve the 
company’s leverage and restore AIG’s outlook in the eyes of credit rating agencies (Moody’s 
Investor Service 2008; Moody’s Investor Service 2009). However, the added commitment of 
$70 billion in taxpayer money, on top of the $85 billion RCF, drew stark criticism from 
Congress and the public. Disapproval focused in part on the $165 million in retention 
bonuses for executives in the AIG unit that caused a large portion of its financial losses 
(SIGTARP 2009a, 15–18). 
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American International Group 2008:  United States Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
 











Size of banking system 
 
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
 
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of 
financial system in 2007 
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of 
financial system in 2008 
Five-bank concentration of banking 
system 
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
Foreign involvement in banking system 22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Government ownership of banking 
system 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to 
$100,000 for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$250,000 for 2008  
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank, 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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By September 2008, wholesale credit markets in the US, which has been under stress most 
of the year as a result on effects from the subprime mortgage crisis were showing significant 
signs of strain, which would only worsen when on September 15, the investment bank 
Lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy. (FCIC 2010, 349).  The effects of the bankruptcy were 
felt throughout the fincial system and created additional severe lending stresses as 
companies hoarded their cash.  
For months, American International Group (AIG), a trillion dollar insurance and financial 
products company had been experiencing liquidity strains. Although its balance sheet was 
huge,  most of its  liquid assets and cash were held in its regulated insurance subsidiaries 
whose regulators would not permit the cash to flow to the holding company or other non-
insurance subsidiaries. (FCIC 2010, 344). In the days prior to the Lehman bankruptcy AIG 
sought a loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). (FCIC 2010, 345). 
On September 16, 2008, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, utilizing its 
emergency lending powers under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, announced, with 
the full support of the Treasury Department, that it had authorized the FRBNY to lend up to 
$85 billion to AIG (FRBd 2008b; FRBd 2016). The FRBNY would enter into the  Revolving 
Credit Facility (RCF) with AIG, which offered AIG an immediate liquidity cushion to address 
funding strains some due to collateral calls from trading partners and counterparties of the 
AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) division (GAO 2011, 25). (See Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a 
for more details on the terms of the RCF.) 
The RCF was the first federal assistance provided to AIG. However, it quickly seemed 
insufficient to alleviate AIG’s worsening capital and liquidity woes. The company drew $72 
billion on the RCF by early November (FRBd 2016). Credit rating agencies continued to 
express concerns about AIG’s poor capital position and the size and stringency of the 
company’s debt to the FRBNY (GAO 2011, 8). The US government was also worried that 
investors would react badly to the upcoming announcement of major third-quarter losses. 
Negative news could adversely affect investor confidence and damage the value of 
subsidiaries that the company was trying to offload (GAO 2011, 52–53). The FRBNY even 
considered asking the rating agencies to take a “ratings holiday,” that is, to refrain 
temporarily from downgrading the company (GAO 2011, 53). To satisfy rating agencies and 
stabilize AIG’s financial condition, the government decided to restructure the terms of the 
RCF and provide further financial assistance to AIG (GAO 2011 , 52–53). 
The funding to assist AIG was available through the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP), authorized by Congress under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (EESA) on October 3, 2008 (EESA 2008). Administered by the Treasury, TARP made 
available a variety of asset purchase and capital injection facilities “aimed at stabilizing the 
financial system and restoring liquidity, enabling the flow of credit consumers and 
businesses, and restoring economic growth” (Treasury 2009b, Summary).  
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Among them, the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions (SSFI) program aimed “to 
provide stability and prevent disruption to financial markets in order to limit the impact on 
the economy and protect American jobs, savings and retirement security from the failure of 
a systemically significant institution” (Treasury 2008c, 3). The SSFI  was later renamed the 
AIG Investment Program, as AIG was the only company to  benefit from the program (See 
Appendix A more information on the SSFI program.)  
Program Description 
The AIG Investment Program, as the SSFI investments ultimately came to be known, was 
comprised of two components: the initial Nov 2008 TARP investment and, when that proved 
insufficient to alleviate AIG’s woes, the March 2009 investment. 
November 2008 TARP Investment  
On November 10, 2008, the Fed and Treasury announced that Treasury would invest $40 
billion into AIG via the SSFI program, in part to facilitate repayment of a portion of the debt 
owed by AIG under the FRBNY’s RCF and in part to provide a cash buffer on AIG’s balance 
sheet (FRBd 2008b; Webel 2017,14). Since FRBNY’s RCF was extended prior to the passage 
of TARP, the preferred stock obtained in connection with the RCF loan was issued to an 
independent Trust established by the FRBNY, and managed by three independent trustees, 
appointed by the FRBNY, for the benefit of the US Treasury (Webel 2017, 9,11).  The original 
$40 billion, as well as any subsequent capital investments, were made possible through 
EESA, which gave Treasury, through TARP, the ability to invest in the equity of banks and 
other institutions, a power it did not have before.  
AIG and Treasury signed a Securities Purchase Agreement on November 25, 2008, pursuant 
to which, in exchange for its investment, Treasury received 4 million shares of AIG Series D 
fixed-rate cumulative perpetual preferred stock (Series D preferred stock) and a warrant to 
purchase 2% of AIG’s outstanding common stock (Series D warrant) (Treasury 2008f, 6). 
Treasury transferred the investment directly to the FRBNY on November 25 on AIG’s behalf 
(Treasury 2008e, 8). The Series D preferred stock came with an aggregate $40 billion 
liquidation preference, adjusted to $10,000 per share, with a par value of $5.00 per share 
and a perpetual life span (Treasury 2008a, pdf 223). Treasury was to receive cumulative 
dividends on the preferred stock at a rate of 10% per annum paid quarterly when AIG’s 
board of directors declared dividends (Treasury 2008a, pdf 223). Any unpaid dividends 
were to compound quarterly. In addition, the Series D preferred stock ranked senior to all 
other series of preferred stock and AIG common stock (Treasury 2008a, pdf 223). 
Dividends and Directors  
If AIG did not pay dividends to Treasury for four quarters, consecutive or not, Treasury could 
nominate and elect the greater of two new directors to AIG’s board of directors or the 
number of directors equal to 20% of AIG’s board of directors (Treasury 2008a, pdf 111). 
Treasury would be able to elect its choice of directors as a separate class from all other AIG 
share classes (Treasury 2008a, pdf 111). Following four consecutive quarters of dividend 
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payments, thereafter, any Treasury-elected director would have to resign. (Treasury 2008a, 
pdf 111). 
Beyond the election of directors associated with unpaid dividends, the Series D preferred 
stock was non-voting except in the following cases (Treasury 2008a, pdf 111–112): 
1. Any authorization or issuance of shares other than convertible preferred stock 
ranking senior or pari passu to the Series D preferred stock; 
2. Any amendment that adversely affects the rights of the Series D preferred stock; 
3. Any merger, exchange, or similar transaction unless the Series D preferred stock 
remains outstanding or is converted into or exchanged for preference securities of 
the surviving or resulting entity. 
Warrant 
The Series D warrant allowed Treasury, upon exercise, to purchase 53,798,766 shares of AIG 
common stock—then 2% of outstanding AIG common stock—at an initial strike, or exercise, 
price of $2.50 per share (Treasury 2008b, pdf 228). The strike price could be amended based 
on the market price of the common stock on the day of exercise (Treasury 2008a, pdf 136). 
The warrant had a duration of 10 years and could be “exercisable upon issuance, in whole or 
in part” (Treasury 2008b, pdf 136). However, Treasury agreed not to exercise any voting 
power of the common stock received from the exercise of this warrant at any point (Treasury 
2008b, Sec. 4.6, pdf  39). 
Executive Compensation 
Since the November 2008 investment was made through TARP, AIG was required to change 
its compensation structure, bonuses, incentives, benefit plans, and other arrangements with 
senior executive officers to conform to Section 111 of EESA (Treasury 2008g). Section 111 
included an “anti-abuse rule” aimed at preventing executives and top officers at institutions 
receiving TARP aid from reaping the benefits of federal assistance (EESA 2008). EESA 
provided Treasury the ability to change AIG’s executive compensation and corporate 
governance standards, including the compensation for senior executive officers; rules on 
bonuses, retention awards, or other incentive compensation provided to officers and other 
highly compensated employees; and the prohibition of “golden parachute payments” to the 
most senior executive officers, among other regulations (GAO 2009, 60).  
Table 1, compiled by the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (SIGTARP), summarizes the executive compensation and bonus pool terms 
included in the government’s November 2008 investment in AIG. 
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Table 1:  
Executive and Bonus Compensation Terms for Nov. 2008 TARP Investment in AIG 
 
Notes: a Treasury 2008d; b Treasury 2008a; c Treasury 2009b/c 
 Source: SIGTARP 2009b. 
 
Corporate Governance 
In terms of lobbying restrictions, AIG had to adhere to a new “comprehensive written policy 
on lobbying, governmental ethics, and political activity,” wherein any changes to the existing 
terms required approval by Treasury (Treasury 2008f, 4). EESA rules also mandated that 
AIG create a new plan for corporate spending to be approved by Treasury. (Treasury 2008g).  
The initial term sheet required AIG to create a risk management committee that would 
“oversee the major risks involved in [AIG’s] business operations and review [AIG’s] actions 
to mitigate and manage those risks” (Treasury 2008f, 5). The term sheet required AIG to 
create such a committee within 30 days of the investment, and it would have to be active, at 
the minimum, until Treasury no longer owned any shares of Series D preferred stock or 
common shares purchased through the Series D warrant (Treasury 2008a, pdf 45; Treasury 
2008f, 5). Last, the term sheet stipulated that AIG was subject to the same reporting 
requirements that it had to follow under the FRBNY’s Revolving Credit Facility (Treasury 
2008f, 4). 
March 2009 TARP Investment 
Despite the earlier government assistance, AIG’s woes continued and it worried about  
another ratings downgrade; the ratings agencies were concerned about a number of factors, 
including the impact of the RCL on AIG’s leverage ratio. (FRBd 2008c) In March 2009, 
Treasury announced a second investment under the AIG Investment Program in the form of 
a $30 billion funding commitment, sometimes referred to as the Equity Capital Facility (ECF), 
which had a duration of five years, until April 17, 2014 (AIG n.d., 11). In return for the new 
funding commitment, Treasury received the right to purchase 300,000 shares of Series F 
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fixed-rate non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (Series F preferred stock) in AIG, as 
well as another warrant (Series F warrant), this time to purchase 1% of AIG common stock 
as of the date of the warrant ((Treasury/FRBd 2009; Treasury 2009 2–3). The ECF went into 
effect on April 17, 2009 (GAO 2009, 35).  
The Series F preferred stock had a par value of $5.00 per share, with its liquidation 
preference beginning at $0 upon issue to Treasury (Treasury 2009d, 8) The stock’s 
liquidation preference increased by the amount drawn on the new commitment (Treasury 
2009d, 5–6). According to SIGTARP, “the shares had no value until cash was disbursed from 
Treasury,” or drawn upon by AIG (SIGTARP 2009c, 62). For example, if AIG drew $1 billion 
from the March 2009 investment, the overall value of the Series F preferred stock would 
increase to $1 billion, reducing the available amount of the Treasury’s investment by an 
equal amount. 
As part of the restructuring, the Treasury also exchanged its Series D cumulative preferred 
stock for 400,000 shares of Series E non-cumulative preferred stock. The new shares had 
characteristics closer to common stock are were intended to boost AIG’s balance sheet.  
Commitment to make retention payments 
 Treasury provided AIG $165 million of the total $30 billion commitment to make retention 
payments to AIG Financial Product employees (Treasury 2009d , 1). The ECF agreement 
required AIG to repay Treasury for its commitment via three installments of $55 million  each 
from its operating cash flow: on December 17, 2010. August 17, 2012, and April 17, 2014 
(Treasury 2009d , 2). 
Dividends 
Under the Series F purchase agreement, AIG could not make dividend payments on any basic 
common stock or redeem any shares of common or other capital stock, without the consent 
of Treasury, prior to the termination of the March 2009 investment. The Series F preferred 
stock became the most senior of all AIG preferred stock (Treasury 2009a, 2). Treasury would 
receive non-cumulative dividends “at a rate per annum equal to the applicable dividend rate 
[10% per annum] on the applicable liquidation amount per share of the Series F preferred 
stock,” payable quarterly, in arrears on February 1, May 1, August 1, and November 1 every 
year, and payable when declared by AIG’s board of directors (Treasury 2009a, A-2). 
As shareholders of the Series F preferred stock, Treasury had the right to nominate and elect 
the greater of two new directors to AIG’s board of directors or the amount of directors equal 
to 20% of AIG’s board (Treasury 2009a, A-7). However, unlike the Series D preferred stock, 
this right would become exercisable if dividends were not paid for any four quarters, 
whether consecutive or not (Treasury 2009a, A-7). 
Warrant 
Treasury’s purchase of the Series F warrant on April 17 enabled the government to purchase 
1%, or 3,000 outstanding, unissued shares of AIG common stock (Treasury 2009e, 2). The 
warrant had an initial strike, or exercise, price of $2.50 per share and a 10-year limit 
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“exercisable upon issuance, in whole or in part” (Treasury 2009f, 5). Moreover, Treasury 
agreed not to exercise any voting rights of AIG common stock acquired upon exercising the 
Series F Warrant (Treasury 2009f, 7). 
Executive Compensation  
Executive compensation restrictions were broadened with the passage of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) in February of 2009. Bonus restrictions 
from EESA that applied exclusively to senior executive officers (SEOs) extended to SEOs and 
the 20 next highest paid employees (ARRA 2009, 518). AIG was allowed to issue “long-term, 
restricted stock” to those same employees in lieu of now-prohibited bonuses, retention 
awards, and incentive payments, so long as the stock did not vest while AIG had TARP funds 
outstanding and the grant would not be more than one-third of total compensation to the 
employee receiving it (ARRA 2009 , 518). Prohibitions on golden parachute payments, 
likewise, were extended to SEOs and the five next highest paid employees.  
Corporate Governance 
There were no significant changes with respect to corporate governance in the March 2009 
restructuring. After the March 2009 investment, Treasury issued additional guidance on 
these issues, summarized in their Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for Compensation 
and Corporate Governance, released on June 10, 2009 (Treasury 2009c). 
This rule was designed to implement the ARRA provisions and consolidate all of the 
executive-compensation-related provisions directed at TARP recipients into a single rule. 
The rule (1) limited executive compensation for certain executives and highly compensated 
employees at companies receiving TARP funds, (2) appointed a special master to review 
compensation plans at such firms, (3) implemented and expanded earlier Treasury 
proposals regarding the need for shareholders and directors to work together on 
compensation issues, (4) set additional compensation and governance standards for firm to 
improve accountability and disclosure. (Treasury 2009c).  
For an overview of the two TARP investments in AIG in November 2008 and March 2009, 
see Table 2. 
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Table 2: November 2008 and March 2009 TARP Investments in AIG   
 November 2008 Investment March 2009 Investment 
Program Systemically Significant Financial Institutions 
(SSFI) via TARP 
Systemically Significant Financial 
Institutions (SSFI) via TARP 
Date 
Announced 
November 25, 2008 April 17, 2009 
Amount $40 billion capital injection $30 billion commitment 
Preferred Stock 4 million shares of Series D fixed-rate 
cumulative perpetual preferred stock 
(Exchanged for 400,000 shares of Series E 
non-cumulative preferred stock in March 
2009) 
300,000 shares of Series F fixed-rate non-
cumulative perpetual preferred stock 
($2 billion was exchanged for 20,000 
shares of Series G cumulative preferred 
stock at Recapitalization in January 2011) 
Warrant 2% of AIG’s outstanding common stock 1% of AIG’s outstanding common stock 
 
Outcomes 
November 2008 Investment 
On November 10, 2008, the Board of Governors, Treasury, and AIG announced a 
restructuring plan for AIG (which closed on November 25, 2008) (COP 2010b; Treasury 
2008f). The November 2008 investment enabled AIG to repay some of the amount that it had 
drawn on the FRBNY’s RCF; the amount of available credit under the RCF was also reduced 
from $85 billion to $60 billion (FRBd 2016, 6).  
The November 2008 investment helped to restructure AIG’s balance sheet, thereby avoiding 
any downgrades from the major credit rating agencies. It also contributed to a restructuring 
of the terms of the RCF under the Credit Agreement (YPFS 2018a). The AIG common stock 
into which the Series C preferred stock issued pursuant to the RCF could be converted was 
adjusted to 77.9% of AIG outstanding common stock to accommodate the 2% conversion 
under the Series D warrant, keeping the total conversion amount at less than 80% for 
accounting reasons (Treasury 2008f, 6) . Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
standards, if the government’s ownership was 80% or greater, it would be deemed to control 
the company and would be required to consolidate AIG”s balance sheet with the government 
balance sheet, something the government sought to avoid, although ultimately, it would have 
to consolidate the company. (See Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a for more information on the 
changes implemented to the terms of the RCF and the preferred stock.) 
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With the expectation that 2008 fourth-quarter losses would be greater than $40 billion and 
that credit agencies would further likely downgrade AIG, the US government sought to 
provide additional aid to the insurance firm (COP 2010b, Sec. 1[D][1]).  In March 2009, the 
US government announced a second restructuring plan for AIG, which included exchanging 
the 4 million shares of Series D preferred stock worth $40 billion  for 400,000 shares of Series 
E preferred stock worth $41.6 billion4 (SIGTARP  2009c,  62). The Series E preferred stock 
provided for non-cumulative dividends, unlike the cumulative dividends of Series D, and 
limited AIG’s ability to redeem the preferred stock except with the proceeds from the 
issuance of equity capital” (SIGTARP 2009c, 62). The Series E preferred stock also permitted 
Treasury to elect new directors to AIG’s board of directors if dividends were not paid for four 
quarters, consecutive or not (SIGTARP 2009, 61).  
The Series E preferred stock was also subject to a Replacement Capital Covenant, which 
stated that AIG could not repurchase the Series E preferred stock from Treasury prior to 
April 17, 2012, unless AIG replaced the Series E preferred stock with “qualifying equity 
replacement capital securities” (Treasury 2009d, 1). Eligible qualifying securities included 
common stock, qualifying warrants, qualifying non-cumulative preferred stock, or 
mandatorily convertible preferred stock (Treasury 2009d, 1). 
In their initial report to Congress, Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board stated that the 
new Series E preferred stock would “more closely resemble common equity and thus 
improve the quality of AIG’s equity and financial leverage” (Treasury 2009b, 8–9). The Series 
E shares were seen as more like common shares because their dividends were non-
cumulative, meaning the company was under no obligation to pay past dividends; the Series 
D preferred shares had been cumulative (GAO 2011, 10–11). This idea proved successful as 
credit rating agencies viewed the new Series E preferred stock more favorably than the 
Series D preferred stock when assessing AIG’s financial situation at the time (GAO 2011, 10– 
11). 
During AIG’s 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, AIG stockholders voted to conduct a 20-
to-1 reverse stock split, which affected the total amount of stock available for purchase under 
the Series D warrant, but nonetheless allowed Treasury to purchase 2% of the outstanding 
AIG common stock upon exercise (SIGTARP 2011, 61). Another vote during the meeting 
increased the exercise price of AIG common stock from $2.50 to $50.00 per share (SIGTARP 
2011, 61). (See Buchholtz and Lawson 2021a for more information on the events of the 2009 
shareholder meeting.) 
In September 2010, Treasury, the FRBNY, and AIG, designed a Recapitalization Plan 
(Recapitalization) for all of the federal assistance provided to AIG (AIG et al 2010a). As part 
of the Recapitalization, Treasury converted the 400,000 shares of Series E preferred stock to 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4  The 400,000 shares of Series E preferred stock were valued at $104,011.44 per share, up from the $10,000 
per share of the Series D preferred stock. The higher proportional value per share for Series E shares also 
includes about $1.6 billion in cumulative unpaid dividends that was due to Treasury on the Series D preferred 
stock (GAO 2011). 
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924,546,133 shares of AIG common stock, on January 14, 2011, representing 51.4% of all 
outstanding AIG common stock (AIG et al 2010a, 2). 
Executive Compensation Controversy 
In March 2009 it became public knowledge that AIG planned to pay $218 million in retention 
bonuses  to more thana 400 employees of its AIG Financial Product Division, which  had 
contributed to AIG’s near-failure . While the payments provoked public outcry, legal opinions 
from private parties and government counsels all concluded that the retention plans for 
those employees were contractually binding (SIGTARP 2009a, Summary). More specifically, 
because AIG agreed to the payments prior to the passage by Congress of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) on February 11, 2009, the payments were 
not subject to executive compensation restrictions enacted by EESA, ARRA, or related 
Treasury guidelines. (SIGTARP 2009a, 400).5 In late March 2009, Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner requested that the Department of Justice (DOJ) conduct an investigation 
into the retention payments and determine if there was a “legal basis to recoup the retention 
awards” (SIGTARP 2009a, 17). However, the DOJ concluded there were no alternatives to 
paying the bonuses that had legal merit (SIGTARP 2009a, 17). 
March 2009 Investment 
At the 2009 Annual Meeting, shareholders passed a resolution to reduce the par value of AIG 
common stock, which reduced the Series F warrant’s exercise price from $2.50 to $0.00002 
per share (SIGTARP 2011, 63).  
Prior to recapitalization, AIG had drawn about $7.5 billion of the $30 billion March 2009 
investment (GAO 2011, 33). However, the March 2009 investment played a large role during 
the January 2011 recapitalization of AIG. Of the $7.5 billion drawn on the commitment, 
Treasury exchanged $2 billion of the Series F preferred stock for 20,000 shares of Series G 
preferred stock (AIG et al 2010; AIG 2011, 11). Treasury exchanged the remaining $5.5 
billion of Series F preferred stock for approximately 167.6 million shares of AIG common 
stock at $2.50 per share (AIG et al 2010a, 1). Last, AIG drew down the remaining amount of 
$20.3 billion under the March 2009 investment to purchase from the FRBNY preferred 
interests in two special purpose vehicles established by AIG (AIA Preferred Interests and 
ALICO Preferred Interests). AIG had transferred such preferred interests to the FRBNY in 
partial payment for amount outstanding under the RCF. (AIG et al 2010, 1-2); AIG 2011, 10). 
Treasury’s Stake in AIG after Recapitalization 
The Office of Financial Stability (OFS), which was created with the passage of TARP to 
manage the program, was used to manage the shares that Treasury held directly. Treasury 
gradually sold the AIG common stock converted from the Series E and the Series F preferred 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 Further, Treasury’s interim final rules on ARRA compensation guidelines for financial institutions receiving 
federal assistance, published on June 15, 2009, also reiterated that restrictions did not apply to payment 
agreements agreed upon prior to the guidelines (SIGTARP 2009a, 30). 
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stock during recapitalization to the public, with the final sale of the remaining stock coming 
on December 10, 2012. Treasury received $38.2 billion in net proceeds from the sales 
(Treasury 2013, 14). Treasury never exercised the Series D and Series F warrants, and in 
March 2013 sold both warrants back to AIG for approximately $25 million, in aggregate 
(Treasury 2013, 14). 
2010 Shareholder Meeting  
By the beginning of February 2010, AIG had not reinstated dividend payments to 
shareholders, which AIG’s board of directors had originally suspended to all share classes on 
September 23, 2008 (AIG 2008, 137). Therefore, on February 1, 2010, following more than 
four quarters without dividend payments, Treasury exercised its right to elect new directors 
to AIG’s board of directors granted by the Series E and Series F preferred stock (GAO 2011; 
Treasury/FRBd 2009). At the time of the 2010 Annual Meeting, since 11 directors held seats 
on AIG’s board, Treasury was able to nominate and elect the number of members equal to 
20% of the board, or in this case, two new directors, increasing the total numbers to thirteen. 
(AIG 2010, 19).  
According to the terms of the Series E and Series F preferred stock, any directors elected by 
Treasury would step down from AIG’s board of directors when dividends had been paid for 
four consecutive quarters following their election (Treasury/FRBd 2009). However, 
following the execution of the recapitalization, AIG’s Nominating and Corporate Governance 
Committee decided that it would be in the best interest of AIG and its shareholders to keep 
the two Treasury elected directors on AIG’s board of directors. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The AIG Investment Program was part of a multi-faceted intervention by the US 
government.  
The Treasury’s initial investment in AIG, was announced on November 10, 2008, as part of a 
restructuring plan put forth by FRBNY and Treasury. The plan restructured the original aid 
that AIG had obtained from FRBNY under the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) to make the 
terms less aggressive, contingent on the disbursement of a capital injection via the 
Treasury’s purchase of $40 billion in cumulative perpetual preferred Series D stock ((FRBd 
2008c, 4-6). Additionally, the $37.8 billion Securities Borrowing Facility, which had been 
established in early October by the FRBNY, would be terminated in favor of Maiden Lane II 
and III, two new facilities that were designed to purchase (1) residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) in the company’s securities lending  and (2) underlying Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs) from credit default swap counterparties, respectively (FRBd 2008c, 
4-9). The combined funds provided by the Treasury and Fed for AIG totaled $182.3 billion 
(Treasury 2012b). 
2. The Treasury used Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds to finance the 
AIG Investment Program. 
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Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) on October 3, 
2008. Section 101 of the Act established TARP as the principal vehicle through which 
Treasury would fight the crisis (EESA 2008, Sec. 101). The Systemically Significant Failing 
Institutions (SSFI program), later AIG Investment Program, was one of the many programs 
that came out of the first wave of TARP funding and AIG was its only beneficiary (EESA 2008, 
Title). 
3. Treasury, through the Office of Financial Stability, was the manager and 
administrator of the program. 
Treasury created the Office of Financial Stability (OFS) as directed by Section 101 of EESA to 
act as a general administrator for all TARP programs, which included monitoring the equity 
obtained through the AIG Investment Program.  
4. AIG was required to comply with restrictions on executive compensation and 
corporate governance that were outlined in Section 111 of EESA.  
Any institutions that took TARP capital were subject to certain restrictions on executive 
compensation. Treasury, per Section 111 of EESA, required that AIG, “comply with the most 
stringent limitations on executive compensation for its top five senior executive officers” 
(Treasury 2008f). Additionally, the legislation included limitations on bonus and “golden 
parachute” payments, as well as lobbying restrictions (EESA 2008, Sec. 111). 
These restrictions would become more stringent with the passage of ARRA in February of 
2009. The bonus and golden parachute restrictions would be broadened and retention and 
incentive rewards prohibited (except in the case of long-term, restricted stock).6 Treasury 
published additional guidance on executive compensation in an Interim Final Rule, dated 
June 10, 2009. The rule included a clawback provision on executive compensation, the 
creation of a special master for TARP executive compensation, and further accountability for 
the boards of directors of institutions receiving TARP funds (Treasury 2009c). 
In addition to the conditions for accepting the TARP investment, AIG was required to create 
a risk management committee within 30 days that would “oversee the major risks involved 
in [AIG’s] business operations and review [AIG’s] actions to mitigate and manage those 
risks”7 (Treasury 2008f, 5). The committee was required to be active at least until Treasury 
no longer owned any shares of Series D preferred stock or the Series D warrant (Treasury 
2008f, 5). As part of the terms of the Series D stock, the firm also was required to “continue 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 ARRA specified that prohibitions on “accruing any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation” 
during the period in which an institution had TARP funding outstanding would not apply if payments in lieu 
of these were made in the form of “long-term, restricted stock.” These restrictions applied to AIG’s SEOs as 
well as its 20 next-highest compensated employees. For further discussion of the characteristics of this stock 
see ARRA, Sec. 7001. 
7 While the term sheet said AIG had to create such a committee within 30 days of the investment, Treasury’s 
guidelines to EESA released in early October 2008 dictated that a committee must be created within 90 days 
(Treasury 2008d). 
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to maintain and implement its comprehensive written policy on lobbying, governmental 
ethics, and political activity . . . .” (Treasury 2008f, 4). Any changes to this plan were required 
to be approved by Treasury (Treasury 2008f , 3). 
5. FRBNY and Treasury released the details of the AIG Investment Program and 
Restructuring Plan on November 10, 2008, the same day that AIG released its third-
quarter results. 
The decision to release details of the Restructuring Plan on the same day that AIG released 
its earnings was made because officials had anticipated that AIG would face the possibility 
of a ratings downgrade or other negative market reaction based on newly reported losses  
(GAO 2011 , 52 - 53). Treasury stated that, “Together with the steps taken by the Federal 
Reserve, this restructuring will improve the ability of the firm to execute its asset disposition 
plan in an orderly manner” (Treasury 2008f). Treasury further stated that the $40 billion 
investment “was necessary to preserve stability in the financial system and to give AIG time 
to sell assets in an orderly manner to pay back taxpayers” (Treasury 2008e, 8). 
6. Treasury invested $40 billion into AIG in November 2008 as part of a joint 
Treasury–Federal Reserve restructuring effort of AIG assistance to improve its 
capital position. 
Despite the $85 billion RCF that the government extended to AIG on September 22, 2008, the 
company’s liquidity issues persisted, and AIG remained at risk of a ratings downgrade (GAO 
2011, 129). The loan alleviated AIG’s immediate problems, but it actually “increased the 
company’s leverage and lowered [its] interest coverage ratio, two key metrics used by credit 
rating agencies in assessing the financial strength of an issuer” (FRBd 2008c, 4).  
As a result, on November 10, 2008, the Board of Governors and Treasury announced a 
restructuring plan pursuant to which Treasury would invest $40 billion in funds in AIG, 
which the company would use to pay down amounts borrowed under the RCF. (Treasury 
2008f). According to Treasury, the investment aimed to “restructure federal assistance” to 
AIG and help it to “execute its asset disposition plan in an orderly manner” (Treasury 2008f) 
by “establish[ing] a ‘durable capital structure’ for AIG and facilities designed to resolve the 
liquidity issues AIG had experienced in its CDS [credit default swap] portfolio and its US 
securities lending program” (AIG 2008, 1). Treasury also would exchange the preferred 
shares that it held for a new preferred share that had more properties in common with 
common stock. And  the credit agreement was amended to reduce the interest rate, the 
commitment fee, and the maturity date associated with the RCF which was extended from 
two years to five years. (FRBNY 2008).  (GAO 2011, 45).  
7. Treasury received shares of Series D cumulative preferred stock and a warrant to 
purchase 2% of outstanding AIG common stock to increase the return to taxpayers 
in the event that AIG ultimately recovered. 
According to the Federal Reserve Board general counsel Scott Alvarez, Treasury’s receipt of 
Series D preferred stock was based on a review of the equity classes that were already 
authorized by the company. Alvarez stated that in order to come to agreements with AIG 
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quickly, the government needed to use every resource available and avoid having to seek a 
shareholder vote in order to issue new classes of preferred stock (YPFS 2018b).  
Lastly, Treasury also received a 10-year Series D warrant that allowed it to purchase 
53,798,766 shares of AIG common stock, which represented 2% of outstanding AIG common 
stock at the time (Treasury 2008b, pdf 127). The strike price, which was $2.50 at the time, 
could be amended based on the market price of the common stock on the day of exercise 
(Treasury 2008a, pdf 136). The warrant, if exercised, allowed the sale of AIG common stock, 
which would contribute to Treasury’s ability to recoup the funds invested in AIG (Treasury 
2008a , pdf 131–144).  
8. The Series D cumulative preferred stock was exchanged for Series E non-
cumulative preferred stock that better resembled common equity in March 2009. 
The exchange from Series D to E preferred stock occurred on March 4, 2009, after a 
restructuring agreement, dated March 2, was finalized. One of the major changes that came 
with this exchange was that the dividends on the Series E preferred equity were non-
cumulative, whereas they were cumulative for the Series D preferred equity (GAO 2011, 10). 
The Series E preferred stock (and Series F preferred stock after it) more closely resembled 
common equity, as AIG was not obligated to pay out missed dividends, and thus, rating 
agencies evaluated the stock more positively (GAO 2011, 10–11). 
9. The Series E Preferred Stock was subject to a Replacement Capital Covenant, which 
clarified Treasury’s senior rights to repayment and served as notice that the 
government would continue to support AIG. 
A Replacement Capital Covenant (the Covenant) was placed on the Series E preferred stock 
to ensure that AIG could not repurchase the Series E preferred stock prior to repaying 
Treasury for the November 2008 investment, unless AIG replaced the Series E preferred 
stock with “qualifying equity replacement capital securities” (Treasury 2009d, 1). The 
Covenant also provided that Treasury would have senior rights to receive repayments before 
any new AIG debtholders. 
Treasury’s Chief Restructuring Officer, Jim Millstein, stated that the credit rating agencies 
and AIG’s auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, were concerned in early 2009 that AIG would 
announce losses of more than $40 billion in its upcoming 2008 annual report; in fact, AIG 
reported losses of more than $60 billion (COP 2010b, Oversight Report – Section 1[D][5]). 
The rating agencies and AIG’s auditor wanted assurance that the government would 
continue to stand behind AIG after the 2008 losses were reported (YPFS 2018a). More 
specifically, the auditor wished to issue AIG’s financial statements without a going concern 
qualification, which likely would have led to a credit downgrade, and consequently to further 
liquidity runs on AIG by counterparties (YPFS 2018a). The Covenant served as a notice that 
the government stood behind its investments to AIG and allowed the auditor to feel 
comfortable in issuing AIG’s 2008 statements (YPFS 2018a).  
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10. In March 2009, Treasury committed an additional $30 billion to AIG via the AIG 
Investment Program to signal that the government would continue to stand behind 
AIG. 
In a joint press release with the Federal Reserve Board, on March 2, 2009, Treasury 
announced its intent to commit the $30 billion investment, sometimes referred to as the 
Equity Capital Facility (ECF). (Treasury/FRBd 2009). AIG assets continued to be in low 
demand and the possibility of further credit downgrades again was a major factor in the US 
government’s decision (Treasury/FRBd 2009). According to Treasury’s Chief Restructuring 
Officer, Jim Millstein, fourth-quarter 2008 losses “prompted AIG’s auditors and credit rating 
agencies to require incremental equity in order to ensure that [AIG] had sufficient liquidity” 
(COP 2010a, 8). The new commitment signaled to AIG’s auditors and credit rating agencies 
that the US government stood behind AIG even with its losses, providing an additional $30 
billion of credit if need be, thereby allowing the auditor to issue AIG’s 2008 financial 
statements without a going concern qualification and allow AIG to maintain its credit ratings 
(COP 2010a , 8). 
At the time, according to FRBNY records, the government considered a variety of new 
financial packages for AIG. One possibility was to establish “a derivatives products company 
with a government backstop to engage in transactions with AIG Financial Products’ 
derivative counterparties . . . .” Another was to fully nationalize AIG. This was seen as a 
potentially attractive option because, “…although nationalization posed a number of risks 
and issues, it simplified certain aspects of the AIG situation. For instance, it would have 
provided a solution for AIGFP, prevented credit ratings downgrades, and addressed complex 
restructuring issues that would no longer have been relevant”  (GAO 2011, 50). Ultimately, 
what became the March 2009 investment was intended to “strengthen AIG’s capital levels 
and improve its leverage” (GAO 2011 , 11). 
As part of the March 2009 investment agreement, AIG was to submit an outline on its use of 
the capital received from Treasury’s purchase of Series F preferred stock (Treasury 2009d, 
5). According to a July 2010 SIGTARP report, AIG used funds from the March 2009 
investment to (SIGTARP 2010, 87–88): 
“meet capital solvency requirements resulting from declines in the value of AIG’s 
investments, purchase shares of United Guaranty Corporation (“UGC”), an AIG 
subsidiary; provide capital support to UGC; settle payments for UGC; redeem all of its 
preferred shares held by National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh; 
purchase its shares from American International Assurance Co., Ltd. (“AIA”) 
subsidiaries AIA(B) and Philam Life AIG; and purchase its shares held by the 
American Life Insurance Company (“ALICO”) unit (Japan).”  
11. Treasury received shares of Series F non-cumulative preferred stock and a 
warrant to purchase 1% of outstanding AIG common stock to provide further 
potential upside to taxpayers. 
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As in the case of the Series D shares, the Treasury chose to receive preferred shares. Like the 
Series E shares, dividend payment under the Series F preferred stock were non-cumulative. 
The Series F preferred stock also came with warrants. Similar to the Series D warrant 
included in the November 2008 investment, the Series F warrant served as an additional 
consideration to the corresponding preferred stock. If exercised, the sale of the received 
common stock could contribute to Treasury’s ability to recoup the funds invested in AIG 
(Treasury/FRBd 2009; Treasury 2008f).  
12. Using its authorities under Section 111(b) of EESA, Treasury imposed executive 
compensation, bonus payment, and corporate governance restrictions on AIG. 
Based on its powers under Section 111(b) of EESA, Treasury placed strict compensation 
restrictions and corporate governance guidelines on TARP recipients (EESA 2008). Prior to 
the announcement of the first restructuring plan, however, Treasury determined that 
because AIG was already receiving federal assistance from the FRBNY, via the RCF and 
Maiden Lane facilities, it would impose “greater compensation restrictions than those 
imposed on [other] financial institutions” receiving TARP assistance (SIGTARP 2009a 4).  
According to the Treasury’s Notice 2008-PSSFI, to comply with EESA Section 111(b)(2)(A), 
a committee had to be established “to review the relationship between risk management 
policies and executive compensation arrangements” (Treasury 2008d, 3). The committee 
also had to review compensation plans for senior executive officers and ensure that those 
employees were not incentivized via bonuses to take “unnecessary and excessive risks that 
threaten the value of the financial institution” (Treasury 2008d, 3). 
13.  Of the total March 2009 investment, $165 million was allocated to retention 
payments to AIG Financial Products employees. These payments were seen as 
contractually committed and necessary to maximize value as AIG unwound its 
derivatives portfolio. 
Although $30 billion was committed, in aggregate, to AIG under the March 2009 investment, 
the maximum commitment decreased to slightly more than $29.8 billion after Treasury 
designated $165 million of the commitment to retention payments for employees of AIG 
Financial Products (AIGFP), AIG Trading Group, Inc., and the respective subsidiaries of both8 
(GAO 2009, 35). These retention payments were intended to maintain operations and 
contribute to the wind down of CDS portfolios within the Financial Products division. 
However, to ensure that Treasury recouped the $165 million, a commitment fee was 
included in the terms of the March 2009 investment, which AIG would pay in three 
installments of $55 million each, due on December 17, 2010; August 17, 2012; and April 17, 
2014 (Treasury 2009d , 2). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
8 Shortly after the creation of the March 2009 investment, the House of Representatives passed a bill that 
placed a 90% tax on all bonuses paid to employees of companies receiving TARP funds. The Senate version of 
the bill decreased the bonus tax to 70% (35% to the corporation and 35% to the employee), however it did 
not pass when brought to a vote (Dye 2010). 
100




At the time of both TARP investments, the FRBNY was closely monitoring AIG’s financial 
situation and was aware of the payments extended to employees to retain their services as 
they wound down the complex trades and general operations of AIGFP (SIGTARP 2009a, 11 
–13). It was not until late February 2009 that Treasury was included in discussions about 
the retention plans for AIGFP employees, as the retention payments had “garnered press and 
Congressional attention” (SIGTARP 2009a, 13).  
According to then–Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, former AIG Chief Executive 
Officer Ed Liddy communicated to him that $165 million of retention bonuses were 
“contractually committed and payable by March 15 [2009]” to AIGFP employees and that the 
“contracts were legally binding” (Geithner 2009, 1). Following the advice of Treasury’s 
counsel, Geithner indicated that any contracts signed prior to the passage of the ARRA were 
still effective, notwithstanding any executive compensation limits under ARRA (Geithner 
2009, 1). Thus, Treasury and AIG devoted $165 million of the March 2009 investment to the 
retention payments, including commitment fees “to recover funds on behalf of taxpayers” 
(Geithner 2009, 2). 
14.  In 2011, the Treasury and Federal Reserve engaged in a proactive restructuring 
and recapitalization to reduce AIG’s reliance on government funding and allow the 
government to exit its investment in AIG. 
While the preferred stock had a perpetual term length, the original SSFI agreement provided 
that Treasury’s consent would be needed if any equity were repurchased prior to (1) the fifth 
anniversary of the agreement being signed, or (2) the entirety of Treasury’s stake in AIG 
being sold off to third parties. Subsequent to one of these conditions being met, AIG could 
purchase the warrant for the Series D preferred stock (Treasury 2008f, 2). The Equity Capital 
Facility (ECF) also had a five-year lifespan, but neither the ECF nor the original SSFI 
investment was held for that long. 
Following the signing of the Recapitalization Agreement on January 14, 2011, the Treasury 
exchanged its remaining preferred stock for common stock. After completion of the plan, 
Treasury held about 1.65 billion shares of AIG common stock that it would offer to the public 
(GAO 2012, 10–12). The $30 billion ECF from the March 2009 agreement would, in 
conjunction with the January 2011 agreement, be converted into (1) approximately 167 
million shares of common stock, (2) 20,000 shares of Series G cumulative preferred stock, 
and (3) preferred Interests in the AIA and ALICO SPVs (AIG 2011, 11).  
Treasury began to sell its holdings of AIG common stock in early 2011 through six public 
offerings (Treasury 2012a, 1).  These sales garnered an average price of $31.18 per share 
and netted the government approximately $4.1 billion in profits (Treasury 2012a, 1).  The 
final sale occurred on December 10, 2012 (Treasury 2013, 14).  The Treasury also earned 
$0.9 billion from its preferred stock holdings, for a combined profit of $5 billion. (Treasury 
2012a, 1).  
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Treasury authorized a total of $69.8 billion for investment into AIG and ultimately disbursed 
$67.8 billion (Treasury 2013, 14).  Treasury exchanged AIG’s right to draw down the final $2 
billion for 20,000 shares of Series G preferred stock (AIG 2011, 11). Treasury completed the 
public sale of all TARP-related AIG common stock that it held in December 2012 (Webel 
2013, 2).  AIG would repurchase the Series D and Series F warrants on March 1, 2013, for 
$25 million (Treasury 2013, 14). According to the Congressional Research Service, the final 
net loss for Treasury on its TARP investments in AIG approximated $13.5 billion; however, 
the overall profit from sales of AIG stock held by the government, including the stock held by 
the AIG Trust, were approximately $5 million (Webel 2013, 9). 
Although proceeds from the TARP reimbursements were less than Treasury’s investments, 
the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) 
argued, “this was offset by the proceeds from the additional Treasury shares of AIG, resulting 
in overall proceeds exceeding disbursements for Treasury” (Treasury 2013, 14). 
Credit rating agencies viewed both TARP investments in AIG favorably, maintaining AIG’s 
credit rating following each of the two investment announcements in November 2008 and 
March 2009 (Moody’s Investor Service 2008; Moody’s Investor Service 2009). Commenting 
on the November 2008 investment, Moody’s said, the “recapitalization and de-risking 
transactions provide AIG with additional time and flexibility to facilitate asset sales and 
bolster AIG’s operating performance” (Moody’s Investor Service 2008). Moody’s also said 
the new capital structure would promote market confidence, especially from AIG 
counterparties, and “[provide] significant incremental protection for senior creditors” at the 
time (Moody’s Investor Service 2008). In March 2009, despite AIG’s $61.7 billion loss for the 
fourth quarter of 2008, Treasury’s $30 billion investment gave credit rating agencies 
renewed confidence in AIG’s viability (Moody’s Investor Service 2009). S&P said the new $30 
billion commitment and the continuance of federal financial assistance to AIG “improves 
[AIG’s] capital adequacy and reduces pressure on debt holders” (Scroggins 2009). 
The $165 million AIGFP retention payments and exclusion of 57 employees from executive 
compensation restrictions drew considerable public and congressional outrage in March 
2009 (SIGTARP 2009a, 16–18). SIGTARP released an audit examining the compensation 
plans at AIG. It noted that the public and Congress mainly questioned why AIG was rewarding 
the employees of the division whose losses were largely blamed for the losses and near 
bankruptcy of the company, meaning the Financial Products Division (AIGFP).  (SIGTARP 
2009a, 2). The SIGTARP audit found that AIGFP employees had lost “$790 million in future 
compensation” based on AIG’s performance as of March 2009 (SIGTARP 2009a, 7). It further 
found that the compensation plans and rewards encouraged employees, who were unsure 
of their job stability because of the market conditions and AIG’s circumstances, to stay with 
AIG (SIGTARP 2009a, 7).  
Through a series of debates over amending the US tax code, Democrats and Republicans both 
agreed that employee bonuses should be subject to a high corporate tax for companies that 
received more than $5 billion from TARP (H.R. 1586, H3656). The bonus tax rate was 
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disputed, ranging from 90% to even 100% of the amount paid out (H.R. 1586, H3656). 
Members of Congress also argued that because Treasury and the FRBNY were so involved 
with AIG, they could have forced AIG to not have paid out any bonuses, have employees repay 
their bonuses, or have negotiated new bonus contracts, similar to how employees of the 
autoworkers were doing as a condition of receiving TARP funds (H.R. 1586, H3657–3658). 
House members described the bonuses as “outrageous” and “an egregious waste of taxpayer 
dollars” (H.R. 1586, H3664). Further, an AIG shareholder filed a civil suit in the Los Angeles 
Superior Court asserting, “there was no rational business purpose or justification for these 
lucrative additional payments, particularly given AIG’s deteriorating financial condition” 
(Eseen 2009). Representatives suggested during a House meeting amending the law so that 
any bonus payments made by TARP recipients to their employees, as well as any future 
contractual obligations, be approved by Treasury prior to any payout (H.R. 1586, H3661). 
Following the public response, New York governor Andrew Cuomo announced that 15 of the 
top 20 bonus recipients at AIG voluntarily returned their bonuses, equal to about an 
estimated $50 million, to AIG (Clifford 2009). 
Because AIG was the only institution to utilize the SSFI program, one scholar, Fabio Leonardi, 
has argued that that the SSFI program, along with other programs like the Targeted 
Investment Program and the Asset Guarantee Program (used by Citigroup and Bank of 
America), were discriminatory and that the US government had violated World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements (Leonardi 2011, Abstract). Given its narrow investment in 
a single institution, Leonardi argued that the SSFI program “discriminated, de facto, against 
foreign-like financial service suppliers commercially present in the US” (Leonardi 2011, 
310). 
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Summary of Program 
Actions Related to AIG – Page on Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s website covering 
highlights, timelines, and documents surrounding FRBNY’s actions on AIG.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Actions%20Related%20to
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Investment in American International Group (AIG) – Page on the US Department of the 
Treasury’s website covering all TARP-related assistance to AIG, which includes press releases, 
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US%20Department%20Inv
estment%20In%20American%20International%20Group%20AIG%202012.pdf 
June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue (Congressional Oversight Report, 06/10/2010)  – 
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ALICO SPV, FRBNY, Treasury, and AIG Credit Facility Trust to issue warrants to purchase 
common stock from November 25, 2008 (Securities Purchase Agreement) and April 17, 2009 
(Securities Exchange Agreement). 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Agreement_to_Amend_
Warrants_20110114.pdf 
Certificate of Designations of Series E Fixed Rate Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock 
of American International Group, Inc. (03/04/2009) – Certificate of Designations by AIG 
creating 400,000 shares of Series E fixed-rate, non-cumulative, perpetual preferred stock.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Designati
ons_Series_E_Preferred_Stock_20090304.pdf 
Certificate of Designations of Series F Fixed Rate Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock 
of American International Group, Inc. (04/17/2009) – Certificate of Designations by AIG 
creating 300,000 shares of Series F fixed-rate, non-cumulative, perpetual preferred stock.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Certificate_of_Designati
ons_Series_F_Preferred_Stock_20090417.pdf 
Master Transaction Agreement (12/08/2010) – Agreement among AIG, the ALICO SPV, the 
AIA SPV, FRBNY, Treasury, and AIG Credit Facility Trust over the closing of the Recapitalization 
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Recapitalization Plan Summary of Terms (09/30/2010) – Document explaining the terms of 
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Recapitalizati
on_Plan_Summary_of_Terms_20100930.pdf 
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wherein AIG issued 1.6 billion shares of common stock to Treasury as part of the 
Recapitalization Plan announced in September 2010, converted from all other preferred shares 
Treasury received through government aid packages to AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AIG_Registration_Rights_Ag
reement_20110114_2.pdf 
Replacement Capital Covenant (04/17/2009) – Document describing terms in reference to the 
Series E preferred stock Treasury received as a result of the Securities Exchange Agreement of 
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Replacement_
Capital_Covenant_20090417_0.pdf 
Securities Exchange Agreement (04/17/2009) – Agreement between AIG and Treasury 
describing the exchange of Series D preferred stock for Series E preferred stock as part of the 
second restructuring plan for federal assistance to AIG.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Securities_Exc
hange_Agreement_20090417_0.pdf 
Securities Purchase Agreement: Series D Preferred Stock (11/25/2008) – Purchase 
agreement entered into by AIG and US Treasury to sell 4 million shares of Series D fixed-rate, 
cumulative, perpetual preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 53.8 million shares of 
common stock to Treasury for $40 billion under TARP’s Systematically Significant Failing 
Institutions (SSFI) program..  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Securities_Purchase
_Agreement_Series_D_Preferred_Stock_20081125.pdf 
Securities Purchase Agreement: Series F Preferred Stock (04/17/2009) – Document that 
authorized the purchase of 300,000 shares of Series F preferred stock by Treasury from AIG in 
exchange for a $30 billion commitment through the TARP SSFI’s Equity Capital Facility (ECF).  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Securities_Pur
chase_Agreement_Series_F_Preferred_Stock_Certificate_20090417.pdf 
TARP AIG SSFI Investment: Summary of Senior Preferred Terms (11/10/2008) – Term sheet 
for Treasury’s $40 billion TARP investment in AIG under the Systemically Significant Financial 
Institutions (SSFI) program.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_TARP_AIG_SSF
I_Investment_Summary_of_Senior_Preferred_Terms_20081110_0.pdf 
Term Sheet: March 2, 2009 (03/02/2009) – Term sheet for Treasury’s exchange of Series D 
preferred stock for Series E preferred stock. The document also describes the terms of a new 
$30 billion TARP capital commitment the Equity Capital Facility, to AIG, in exchange for Series 
F preferred stock and a warrant to purchase common stock. 
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Warrant to Purchase Common Stock (04/17/2009) – Document that authorized the purchase 
of a warrant for Treasury to purchase 3,000 shares of AIG common stock in exchange for a $30 
billion commitment through the TARP SSFI’s Equity Capital Facility (ECF).  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Warrant%20(1).pdf 
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) (02/17/2009) – Law passed by 
Congress to maintain employment and create new job opportunities through a $787 billion 
economic stimulus package. The act included provisions on executive compensation and 
corporate governance.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_111th_Congress_Americ
an_Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Act_of_2009_20090217.pdf 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) (10/03/2008) – Law passed by 
Congress to stabilize the American financial system and restore liquidity in struggling financial, 
bank, and non-bank institutions by creating the $700 billion TARP.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/EESA_2008_10_03.pdf 
Federal Reserve Act, Section 13: Powers of Federal Reserve Banks – Section of the Federal 
Reserve Act that grants emergency authority to the Federal Reserve “in unusual and exigent 
circumstances” to lend to persons, individuals, and companies and spells out the terms of that 




Treasury Department and  Federal Reserve Board and announce restructuring of financial 
support to AIG (11/10/2008) – Press release announcing a $40 billion TARP investment in AIG 
and changes to the AIG Credit Facility, including reduction of the RCF to $60 billion, the 




Treasury Announces the Completion of AIG’s Recapitalization (01/14/2011) – Treasury’s 
announcement that the recapitalization of AIG is complete, the Credit Facility has been 
terminated, and Treasury now owns 92% of the company after conversion of preferred shares 
to common stock. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Treasury_Ann
ounces_Completion_of_AIG_Recapitalization_Transaction_20110114_0.pdf 
Treasury to Invest in AIG Restructuring Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(03/02/2009) – Treasury announces investment in restructuring plan for AIG, which includes 
investing $40 billion of TARP-related money under the Systemically Significant Financial 













AIG ratings affirmed on new bailout plan (Business Insurance – 03/02/2009) – News article 
reflecting the changes in AIG’s credit ratings following the additional $30 billion in TARP funds 
extended to AIG and latest restructuring plan. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Business_Insurance_AIG_rat
ings_affirmed_on_new_bailout_plan_20090302.pdf 
AIG to get $22 billion in TARP funds for Fed exit (Reuters – November 1, 2010) – News article 
describing the final steps to be taken by FRBNY, Treasury, and AIG in the Recapitalization Plan, 
which includes AIG’s drawing an additional $22 billion from the TARP Equity Capital Facility. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Reuters_AIG_to_get_$22_billion
_in_TARP_funds_for_Fed_exit_20101101_0.pdf 
Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer (New York Times – 09/16/2008) – News article on 
the Federal Reserve’s decision-making process on extending an $85 billion loan to AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_Fed's_$85_Billion_Loan
_Rescues_Insurer_20080917.pdf 
Moody’s maintains present ratings on AIG (senior debt at A3, review down); comments on 
3Q08 results and restructuring plan (Moody’s Investor Service – 11/10/2008) – Moody’s 
views the federal restructuring of AIG assistance positively and maintains AIG’s ratings, citing 
that the new infusion of TARP funds provides AIG “with additional time and flexibility to 
facilitate asset sales and bolster AIG’s operating performance.”  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Moody's_Moody's_maintain
s_present_ratings_on_Comments_on_3Q08_results_and_restructuring_plan_20081110.pdf 
Short-Term Solutions to Long-Term Problems (New York Times – 03/26/2009) – News 
article discussing the federal government’s interventions during the crisis, specifically with AIG, 
and whether actions taken help solve the long-term problem too. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/NYT_Short-
Term_Solutions_to_Long-Term_Problems_20090326.pdf 
Treasury will give AIG another $40 billion, restructure loans (ABC News – 11/10/2008) – 
News article on Treasury’s extension of $40 billion to AIG as part of TARP and changes under a 
restructuring plan to the FRBNY’s Revolving Credit Facility. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4157 
Key Academic Papers 
The AIG Bailout (Sjostrom 2009) –  A detailed legal analysis of the AIG bailout. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Afterword_AIG_Bailout_201
5.pdf 









AIG Remains in TARP as TARP’s Largest Investment (SIGTARP, 07/25/2012) – Report from 
oversight officer that discusses TARP investments in AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/SIGTARP_AIG_Remains_in_T
ARP_2012.pdf 
Congressional Oversight Panel Hearing on TARP and Other Assistance to AIG, Written 
Testimony by Jim Millstein Chief Restructuring Officer, US Department of Treasury (COP, 
05/26/2010) –Testimony for Congressional Oversight Panel hearing. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Millstein_Testimony_before
_Congressional_Oversight_Panel_20100526.pdf 
Extent of Federal Agencies’ Oversight of AIG Compensation Varied, and Important Challenges 




Federal Financial Assistance: Preliminary Observations on Assistance Provided to AIG 





Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties (SIGTARP, 11/17/2009) – 
Oversight report discussing Maiden Lane III. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/SIGTARP_Factors_Affecting_
Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties_20091117.pdf 
Financial Crisis: Review of Federal Reserve System Financial Assistance to American 
International Group, Inc. (Government Accountability Office, 09/2011) – Research report 
that discusses government lending to and investments in AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO%20Report%20on%20
Federal%20Reserve%20AIG%20Intervention.pdf 
Initial Section 105(a) Troubled Asset Relief Program Report to Congress for the Period 
October 6, 2008, to November 30, 2008 (Treasury, 12/04/2008) – Information report 
required by EESA  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/US_Treasury_Section_105a_
TARP_Report_to_Congress_October_6_2008_to_November_30_2008_20081204.pdf 
June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue (Congressional Oversight Panel, 06/10/2010)  – 
Congressional Oversight Panel releases information on AIG’s rescue, highlighting hearing 
testimonies, government actions, and impacts of government intervention. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Congressional_Oversight_Pa
nel_June_2010_Report_20100610_2.pdf 
Responses to Questions of the First Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel for 
Economic Stabilization (Treasury, 12/30/2008) – Treasury’s responses to questions relating 
to the first report of the Congressional Oversight Panel For Economic Stabilization regarding 
Treasury’s strategies and use of funds. 
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Troubled Asset Relief Program: Government’s Exposure to AIG Lessens as Equity 
Investments are Sold (Government Accountability Office, 05/2012) – Research report that 
discusses government lending to and investments in AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_TARP_Governments_E
xposure_to_AIG_Lessens_as_Equity_Investments_Are_Sold_201205.pdf 
Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Government Assistance Provided to AIG 




Troubled Asset Relief Program: Update of Government Assistance Provided to AIG 
(Government Accountability Office, 04/2010) – Research report discussion AIG assistance. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_TARP_Update_of_Gove
rnment_Assistance_Provided_to_AIG_201004.pdf 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Implementation and Status (Congressional Research 
Service, 06/27/2013) – Research report that discusses government investments in AIG. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/ra2.pdf 
The US Department of the Treasury: Agency Financial Report (Treasury, 12/11/2013) – 











TARP’s Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (SSFI) 
On October 3, 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
which authorized Treasury to establish a $700 Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and 
a new Office of Financial Stability (OFS) within Treasury (EESA 2008). EESA allowed 
Treasury to purchase and insure assets from financial institutions, which included 
residential mortgages and other financial instruments, such as equities, to “promote 
financial market stability” (GAO 2009, 10). Under TARP, Treasury created the Systemically 
Significant Financial Institutions (SSFI) program “to provide stability and prevent disruption 
to financial markets in order to limit the impact on the economy and protect American jobs, 
savings and retirement security from the failure of a systemically significant institution” 
(Treasury 2008c, 3). The program provided Treasury with the authority to determine: 
1. The extent to which the failure of an institution could threaten the viability of its 
creditors and counterparties; 
2. The number and size of financial institutions that are seen by investors or 
counterparties as similarly situated to the failing institution, or that would 
otherwise be likely to experience indirect contagion effects from the failure of the 
institution; 
3. Whether the institution is sufficiently important to the nation’s financial and 
economic system; or, 
4. The extent and probability of the institution’s ability to access alternative sources of 
capital and liquidity. 
More specifically, the SSFI program aimed to “provide capital on a case-by-case basis to 
systematically significant institutions that are at substantial risk of failure” (Treasury 2008c, 
3). Treasury intended to inject capital through the purchase of debt, equity, or warrants, 
following a consultation with the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
and notifying Congress (Treasury 2008c, 4). Treasury maintained that warrants would be 
required of any institution participating in the SSFI program “to minimize the long-term 
costs and maximize the benefits to the taxpayers in accordance with EESA” (Treasury 2008c, 
4). 
Although the SSFI program was capable of assisting a variety of companies and institutions, 
AIG was the only institution to utilize it throughout the program’s existence. This contributed 
to its being renamed the AIG Investment Program (AIGIP), according to the US Department 









Timeline of Significant Events in AIG Assistance 
 
September 16, 2008:  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, with the 
support of the Treasury, authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York to extend a $85 billion emergency credit line to 
AIG to provide the firm with liquidity assistance and prevent 
its failure. 
 
November 10, 2008:  AIG and Treasury agree in principle, under the Systemically 
Significant Financial Institutions (SSFI) program of the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), for Treasury to 
purchase $40 billion in newly issued Series D preferred stock 
with limited-class voting rights, with the cash being used to 
pay down AIG’s debt under the FRBNY’s Revolving Credit 
Facility.  
 
November 25, 2008:  The purchase agreements for the Series D preferred stock and 
Series D warrant are executed, giving Treasury 4 million 
shares of Series D preferred stock in AIG. The second 
amendment to the Credit Agreement is agreed upon, reducing 
the amount available from the Revolving Credit Facility from 
$85 billion to $60 billion, reducing the interest rate on the 
Facility, extending the duration of the facility to five years, and 
reducing the FRBNY’s controlling equity interest from Series C 
preferred stock to 77.9%.  
 
March 2, 2009: The Board of Governors, Treasury, and AIG announce the 
second restructuring of federal assistance to AIG, involving a 
new Equity Capital Facility under TARP, modifications to the 
Revolving Credit Facility, and changes to the preferred stock 
under the SSFI program.  
 
April 17, 2009: The exchange agreement for Treasury’s shares of Series D and 
Series E AIG preferred stock is executed. The purchase 
agreement for the Series F preferred stock, which Treasury 
received in connection with the Equity Capital Facility, is 
executed. The third Amendment to the Credit Agreement is 
agreed upon. 
 
April 1, 2010: Treasury nominates and elects two new members to AIG’s 
board of directors at the 2010 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, 
after AIG fails to pay dividends out for four quarters. 
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September 30, 2010: Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, AIG and the 
AIG Credit Facility Trust release a Recapitalization Plan for the 
Revolving Credit Facility, which involves the use of funds and 
the equity provided by the two TARP investments. 
 
December 8, 2010:  A Master Transaction Agreement is agreed upon that provides 
all the transactions and terms of the Recapitalization Plan and 
effectively ends the FRBNY’s involvement in AIG. The terms 
include converting all preferred stock held by the AIG Credit 
Facility Trust and Treasury into AIG common stock, with the 
intent to gradually sell such stock to recoup Treasury’s TARP 
investments. 
 
January 14, 2011: The December 2010 Master Transaction Agreement is 
executed. The AIG Credit Facility Trust converts its Series C 
preferred stock to AIG common stock and transfers it to 
Treasury’s General Fund. Treasury’s Office of Financial 
Stability converts Treasury’s Series E and Series F preferred 
stock to AIG common stock. 
 
December 10, 2012:  Treasury sells off the remaining AIG common stock in its sixth 
and final public offering, netting Treasury a $36 billion gain 
and ending any remaining active equity stake in AIG.  
 
March 2013: Treasury sells its Series D warrant and Series F warrants back 
to AIG for approximately $25 million, ending all government 
interest and assistance in AIG. 
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